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PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF A MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE IN A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure' provides for a
motion to suppress the use at trial of property illegally seized and to secure
its return. Because the United States Supreme Court is constantly en-
larging this umbrella of constitutional protection afforded those accused
of crime, there is little doubt that Rule 41 (e) will be a more widely used
weapon in the arsenal of the criminal defense attorney. It is the purpose
of this comment to explore certain procedural problems of the Rule 41 (e)
motion and to suggest one possible procedure as a solution.
Rule 41 has not been amended since 1949, and at present Congress
has provided no detailed procedure for the presentation and disposition
of the motion to suppress evidence. Although the Rules so provide,2 no
district court has undertaken to develop such a procedure. And, even
though the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States has considered extensive revision
of the Rules, much of which has been adopted recently by the Supreme
Court, there has been no such treatment of Rule 41.8 Consequently,
the primary judicial statement on suppression procedure is found in
those few federal cases in which the trial judge was confronted with the
problem.4
The primary concern of this comment is the use of supporting affi-
davits to decide the issue of suppression of evidence before trial. This
will demand (1) an indication of the collateral issues with which the
court must be concerned in establishing any uniform procedure for mo-
tions to suppress evidence; (2) an investigation of the federal cases
which have been concerned with this procedure; and (3) a proposal of a
suitable procedure for the Federal District Courts.
I
Before approaching the decided cases two preliminary issues should be
considered. The first concerns the burden of going forward with the
evidence and the burden of proof when the accused submits his motion
to suppress evidence. Generally, as with any motion, the burden of going
1 Hereafter referred to as the Rules.
2 Rule 57(a): "Rules made by district courts and courts of appeals shall not be incon-
sistent with these rules." See Fischer & Willis, FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULEs (1964): N.J. p. 9
(D.N.J. Rule 21); Pa. p. 55 (W.D.Pa. Rule 23, that the motion must state the grounds
justifying relief); Wash. p. 22 (W.D. Wash. Rule 9, that the motion will be supported by an
affidavit if facts not in the record are relied upon, and that the hearing is discretionary).
3 See Preliminary Drafts of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 31
F.R.D. 665 (1962) and 34 F.R.D. 411 (1964). Proposed changes adopted, 39 F.R.D. 69, 252
(1966).
4 See Rule 57(b) : "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may pro-
ceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute."
forward and the burden of proof are upon the accused as the moving
party; 5 however, the ultimate resolution of this issue actually depends
upon the manner in which the evidence was obtained. For example, if
the search and seizure was incident to a regularly issued warrant, valid
on its face, then the accused must prove lack of probable cause6 or
unreasonable execution of the warrant.7 If the accused proves that the
search and seizure was without either an arrest or a search warrant,
then the burden shifts to the government to prove the existence of prob-
able cause for the search or for the arrest to which the search was inci-
dent.' If the government relies not upon a valid arrest to justify the
search, but upon the alleged consent of the accused, then the govern-
ment has the burden to prove consent by "clear and positive evidence."9
Assuming that the accused successfully challenges the search and seizure,
the government, in order to save the evidence, has the burden to prove an
independent source. 1°
The second preliminary issue concerns the constitutional boundaries
within which any adopted procedure must operate. On the one hand,
there is the right guaranteed the accused by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him... ."" The right to meet witnesses face-to-face and to cross-examine
them to test the accuracy and credibility of their testimony is funda-
mental to insure a fair trial.'2 This right must not be needlessly limited
during any vital issue of the case, and no one will dispute that a decision
5 It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the quantum of proof which either
the accused or the government must produce, once the burden of proof is fixed.
6 Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Batten v. United States, 188
F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1951).
7 Woo Lai Chun v. United States, 274 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1960).
8 Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Rivera,
321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963). See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ; Wrightson
v. United States, 222 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
9 Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1960). See Burke v. United
States, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1964) ; Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962);
McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Roche, 36
F.R.D. 413 (D. Conn. 1965).
10 United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). Likewise, with the claim
of illegal wire tap, the burden is on the accused. "The burden is, of course, on the accused in
the first instance to prove to the. trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully
employed. Once that is established-as was plainly done here-the trial judge must give
opportunity, however, closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of
the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939). See United States v. Casanova, 213 F.Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United
States v. Weinberg, 108 F.Supp. 567, 569 (D.D.C. 1952).
11 United States v. Douglas, 155 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1946). See Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47 (1899); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Dixon v. United States,
333 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1964).
12 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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on the motion to suppress evidence is one of the most crucial events in a
criminal trial. In many cases, a decision to suppress will so hamper the
government's case that the prosecution will be at an end without the
necessity of a trial on the issue of guilt. So also, a decision not to sup-
press will often result in the accused pleading guilty and saving the
government the expense of even a court trial. Thus, there is abundant
reason for affording the accused the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine those who testify to facts tending to show the legality of the
search and seizure. This Sixth Amendment right must be considered
when discussing the possibility of the government's proceeding by means
of affidavits alone. The same is true if the court would insist upon dis-
position of the motion without any hearing from witnesses.
On the other hand, there is the right guaranteed the accused by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that he shall not
"be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. .. "
This constitutional right must be considered when the court decides
whether the government can demand to cross-examine the accused on
his affidavit submitted to support the motion to suppress evidence, es-
pecially if, in the first instance, the court demanded the affidavit. There
is no federal case directly in point holding that the accused waives his
privilege against self-incrimination by swearing to the affidavit. Jeffries v.
United States seems to indicate that there is no waiver.' s If the court
should decide that submission of an affidavit does leave the accused
vulnerable to cross-examination during the hearing on the motion, then
certainly the court is powerless to compel the accused to file an affidavit,
under penalty of summary denial for failure to comply. Such a decision
would be contrary to the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment. None-
theless, the accused would be able still to insist upon his motion to
suppress evidence, in order to protect his right under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Thus, the ultimate result of holding a waiver would be to eliminate
the use of affidavits. 4
These introductory points, then, render more meaningful the prob-
lems with which the trial judge is confronted in the cases next to be
considered. 5
13 Jeffries v. United States, 215 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1954).
14 Query whether this would be contrary to the trend of more liberal criminal discovery
and the use of pre-trial conferences. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
15 Another problem should be noted at this point, namely the extent of use in the case-
in-chief of the affidavit and other evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress.
Although the risk of use in the trial will materially influence the accused's willingness to
submit an affidavit and thereby curtail the court's ability to demand one, ultimate resolution
of the problem is beyond the scope of this comment. Briefly, it seems settled that when the
accused is successful on his motion, none of the proceedings can be introduced into evidence
in the trial. Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Fowler v. United States,
239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Taylor, 326 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964). But
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In 1955, Judge Halbert outlined a procedure to be used when making a
motion under Rule 41(e). 16 In United States v. Warrington, 7 the de-
fendant moved to suppress the use of evidence and for the return of
property on the ground that it was illegally seized without a warrant.
The defendant offered his affidavit as evidence and rested. The govern-
see, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), in which the Court held the affidavit of the
defendant, successful in his motion to suppress, could be used to impeach his testimony at the
trial, when he testified on direct examination that he had never in his life possessed narcotics.
If the accused is unsuccessful in his motion, the law seems to be that the proceedings can be
used in the trial. United States v. Lindsly, 7 F.2d 247 (E.D. La., New Orleans Div. 1925),
rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1926) ; Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627
(7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932); Fowler v. United States, supra. The
penalty imposed by such a ruling has been alleviated somewhat by the Supreme Court holding
that, when the charge is illegal possession, the accused need not allege in his motion that he
owned the property sought to be suppressed. Jones v' United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
This rationale should extend protection for the moving party to any adverse use by the
government of what the accused claims in the hearing on the motion. He must at least claim
some connection with the evidence, and if unsuccessful this alone can be very incriminating.
When two constitutional rights are given the accused, the court should not proceed in such a
manner that one protection will be used only at the expense of the other. Probable cause is
often a dose question of fact; and, should the accused fail to sustain his burden of proof,
he should not be penalized by disclosure at trial, when he was merely exercising a right which
is constitutionally his. In federal civil cases, to accept an affidavit as evidence is generally
held to be improper. Compare United States ex. rel Karpathiou v. Scholtfeldt, 106 F.2d 928
(7th Cir. 1939); N.L.R.B. v. Rath Packing Co., 123 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1941); Prima Products
v. F.T.C., 209 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Grant, 286 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1961) ;
Automobile Sales Co. v. Bowles, 58 F.Supp. 469 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1944). But see, United States
v. Cook, 17 F.R.D. 412 (S.D. Texas, Houston Div. 1955). In Heller v. United States, supra,
the court argued that if the defendant had made the statement out of court similar to the
contents of his affidavit, such would be admissible through the testimony of those who heard
him; however, the fallacy lies in the fact that the accused would make no such statement,
except that he wishes to challenge the search and seizure, as is his right under Rule 41(e).
16 Rule 41(e):
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in
which the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence any-
thing so obtained on the ground that [then listing several causes]. The judge shall receive evidence
on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion .... The motion to suppress evidence may
also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall be made before trial or
hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing. [Emphasis
added]
Rule 47:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during a
trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state. the
grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It may be supported by
affidavit. [Emphasis added]
Rule 12(b) (4):
A motion before trial raising defenses or objection shall be determined before trial unless the court
orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial of the general issue. An issue of fact shall be
tried by jury if a jury trial is required under the Constitution or an act of Congress. Alt other issues
of fact shall be determined by the court with or ioitkout a jury or on affldavits or in such other man-
ner as the court may direct. [Emphasis added]
17 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. N.D. 1955).
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ment objected to such admission and demanded to cross-examine the
defendant on his affidavit. Both sides to the disputed question maintained
their respective positions on the proper procedure to be followed, and
Judge Halbert filed the memorandum to provide a guide for the next
hearing. He held that the phrase "shall receive evidence on any issue
of fact" in Rule 41(e) imposes a mandate on the trial court to hear
competent testimony on any disputed issue of fact. Therefore, submission
of affidavits is proper only if the issue is one of law, on an agreed
statement of facts. 8 In this manner, Rule 47 and Rule 12 (b) (4) amplify
Rule 41 (e).l?
Moreover, since the defendant is the moving party, he has the burden
to go forward with the evidence. When, as in the Warrington case, the
defendant challenges the search without a warrant, he must "make a
prima facie showing before the Government is required to affirmatively
defend the acts of its officers."" The officers are presumed to be acting
legally. In the Warrington case, the burden of proof was on the govern-
ment to justify the search without a warrant; however, as discussed in
Part I, the ultimate burden of proof may be on the accused depending
on the particular claim of illegality.
Judge Halbert next considered the problem of the affidavit filed by
the defendant as evidence. He concludes that an affidavit is not evidence.
To carry his burden of establishing a prima facie case, the defendant
must proceed with competent evidence, subject to cross-examination by
the government. Rule 4721 is permissive and discretionary with the court,
and must yield to the specific command of Rule 41 (e) 22 to hear evidence
when there is a disputed question of fact. Note that this is especially true
when the ultimate burden of proof will be on the accused. Thus, Judge
Halbert ruled that admission of the affidavit was improper and granted
the government's motion to strike it. Since the affidavit is inadmissible,
the question of cross-examining the defendant was solved:
The Government may cross-examine the defendant only if he volun-
tarily submits himself as a witness in the proceedings. With the affidavit
stricken, the Government may not use that as a basis for cross-exami-
nation of the defendant, so the choice is with the defendant whether he
will be a witness and be subjected to cross-examination. If he becomes a
18 "Considering Rule 41 in this light, it appears clearly that an affidavit is never mandatory
and seldom proper, but with the permission of, or at the request of, the Court, may, in some
instances, be quite useful and proper. It would appear quite clearly that when a motion could
be determined on a question of law, an affidavit would be helpful and time-saving for the
Court." United States v. Warrington, supra note 17, at 28.
19 Rules 41(e), 47, 12 (b) (4), supra note 16.
2017 F.R.D. 25, 29 (N.D. Cal. N.D. 1955).
21 See note 16, supra.
22 ibid.
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witness, he can be cross-examined as any other witness. Under no other
circumstances will the Government be permitted to cross-examine him.23
Judge Halbert concludes the opinion with an outline of the procedure
to be observed with Rule 41 (e) motions:
1. The motion for return of property and to suppress evidence must
be in writing.
2. The motion must set forth the ultimate facts which will be relied
upon by the moving party, but should not set forth facts of an evi-
dentiary nature.
3. The motion should not be verified.
4. The motion must be supported by points and authorities.
5. No affidavit may be filed in the proceeding by either the moving
party or the Government without the express consent of the Court
having been first had and obtained. (An affidavit will always be per-
mitted when either party contends that the proceeding can be deter-
mined on a point of law without an issue of fact being involved.)
6. The defendant will be required to support his motion by competent
evidence that must make a prima facie showing that his motion has
merit.
7. The Government will be given an opportunity to controvert the
defendant's evidence given in support of his motion.
8. Both parties will be given all reasonable opportunity to rebut the
testimony offered by the other.
9. The defendant may not be cross-examined by the Government
unless he voluntarily offers himself as a witness in the proceedings.
10. Under no circumstances may either party digress from the true
issues involved in this proceeding, and use it for a "fishing expedition." 24
The primary concern of these cases is to insure that the accused
properly establishes a prima facie case, a showing of facts sufficient to
justify relief and to compel the government to controvert or else suffer
suppression of the evidence. As will be seen, the controversy is whether
this showing should be accomplished by means of affidavits, or by testi-
mony of witnesses, or by a combination of the two.
In United States v. Okawa, 2 Judge Tavares agreed with the procedure
set out by Judge Halbert but would not say flatly that using an affidavit
is improper. (See Judge Halbert's Rule 5.)
Even if, upon a contested hearing, such an affidavit is not considered"evidence" sufficient to shift the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence of the government, it is at least as useful as a statement of
grounds in a motion, and, for aught that a defendant might know in ad-
23 United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 30 (N.D. Cal. N.D. 1955). Note that Judge
Halbert has stricken the affidavit; so, he had no need to consider the situation where one is
used and the government demands to cross-examine the accused on it. However, since he
would allow use of an affidavit in evidence only when no issue of fact is disputed, seemingly
a demand for cross-examination would never arise. Furthermore, he speaks of the defendant"offering himself as a witness," which would imply taking the witness stand.2 4 Ibid.
25 26 F.R.D. 384 (D.Hawaii 1961).
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vance when filing his motion, might conceivably be admitted by the
government, thereby forming an issue of law upon the agreed facts.2 6
In United States v. Labovitz,27 the court held that the motion must
state the basis for relief so that the government will know what it has to
confront at the hearing on the motion. (Compare Judge Halbert's Rule 2.)
The court further reasoned:
Rule 41 has no requirements as to affidavits. Rule 47 makes affidavits
permissive. It is true that some courts have required affidavits. Cf. U.S.
v. Stein, D.C.W.D.N.Y., 53 F. Supp. 911; U.S. v. Vomero, D.C.
E.D.N.Y., 6 F.R.D. 275. There is much to be said for this practice,
but I can not see the legal justification for it.28
The court would be content if the moving party merely stated the ulti-
mate facts upon which he will rely.
In United States v. Privinzini,29 the government took the position that
the use of an affidavit was no longer proper under the Rules; however,
the court held that, in its discretion, it may demand an affidavit if useful
to the resolution of the motion, i.e., to eliminate the need for a factual
hearing."0 In United States v. Vomero,3" the court held that, when the
motion to suppress is made on grounds other than that the warrant is de-
ficient on its face, "some evidence of probative value in affidavit form
should be presented before the court is required to entertain the motion. '3 2
If the accused attacks the warrant itself, use of affidavits is permissive
only; for the court should be able to resolve the motion by reference to
the documents lodged with the court. A motion on any other ground will
be denied unless supported by an affidavit. What the New York courts
are demanding in these cases is the use of the affidavit where the pro-
cedure of Judge Halbert would have the motion itself set out the ultimate
facts relied upon for relief. (Compare Judge Halbert's Rule 2.) However,
Judge Halbert would not agree that the affidavit should include matters
of an evidentiary nature. These New York cases do not require the
conclusion that a disputed question of fact can be resolved on the affi-
davits alone. Quite the contrary, in the Vomero case, the court found
that the affidavits submitted by the defendant and the government agent
"differ widely in their versions of the facts surrounding the entry into
26 Id. at 386, n.2. See United States v. Mazzio, 162 F.Supp.'935 (D.N.J. 1958).
27 20 F.R.D. 3 (D.Mass. 1956).
2 8 Ibid.
296 F.R.D. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). See also United States v. Stein, 53 F.Supp. 911
(W.D.N.Y. 1943).
80 "While a hearing is ordinarily required in such matters, the submission of an affidavit
by the defendant in this case may obviate such a hearing. Whether a court will require
affidavits in other instances is not before me and must be decided as each situation arises."
United States v. Privinzini, 6 F.R.D. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
816 F.R.D. 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
8 2 1d. at 276.
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defendant's dwelling. The factual issues will have to be determined after
the taking of evidence."33
However, in United States v. Jackson,34 the court held that the trial
judge can direct the admission of affidavits by both parties; and the
accused is in no position to object that the court considered the filed affi-
davits in deciding the motion to suppress. Citing two earlier New York
cases,35 the court held that it had discretion to direct submission of
affidavits. These two cases have been discussed above and do not appear
to support the broad ruling of the court in Jackson. In so far as this
allows the trial judge, in all cases if he wishes, to decide the motion with-
out hearing testimony, it endangers the right of the accused under the
Sixth Amendment to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 3
However, the case does not require such a broad and dangerous inter-
pretation. The defendant objected to a search without a warrant. Since
the defendant came within 26 U.S.C. §3601 which allows the government
a statutory right of inspection as a condition precedent to obtaining a
liquor license, the only issue was whether the officers entered during
business hours. This could well be settled by affidavit alone, such that
there would be no factual dispute which would "have to be determined
after the taking of evidence.""
In United States v. Skeeters,3" the defendant moved to suppress a
confession which was allegedly the result of illegal detention through the
combined acts of the federal agents and local police. The disputed facts
were submitted on opposing affidavits. Ultimately, the court found in
favor of the defendant on the issue of illegal detention and ordered the
evidence suppressed. As for the procedure followed, the court said:
Submission of facts by affidavit is approved procedure in these matters.
See U.S. v. Adelman, 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 497; In re Fried, 2 Cir., 161
F.2d 453. Oral examination of affiants often strengthens or weakens
the showing initially made by affidavits. Accordingly, the Court always
invites cross-examination of affiants. Neither party cared to cross-
examine in this case.39
From this footnote in the case, it is difficult to understand exactly what
Judge Tolin means by "approved procedure in these matters." Clearly,
33 Ibid.
34 122 F.Supp. 295 (W.D.N.Y. 1954).
35 United States v. Privinzini, 6 F.R.D. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) and United States v.
Vomero, 6 F.R.D. 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
36 United States v. Douglas, 155 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1946). See Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47 (1899) ; Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931) ; Dixon v. United States,
333 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1964).
37 United States v. Vomero, 6 F.R.D. 275, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
38 122 F.Supp. 52 (S.D. Cal. C.D. 1954).
39 Id. at 53, n.. It is interesting to note that, although the consent of both the de-
fendant and the government would seem to preclude any need at all, Judge Tolin felt con-
strained to discuss procedure.
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he places the emphasis on the showing in the affidavit rather than on direct
testimony and cross-examination.
Reliance on the two cases cited seems misplaced. In United States v.
Adelman,4" the issue was consent to search. The trial judge had "ruled
that the issue of consent should not be determined upon affidavits and
denied the motion without prejudice to renewal upon trial." 1 [Emphasis
added.] The appellate court held that it is within the trial court's "dis-
cretion to decide that oral testimony was necessary and to leave the
decision to the trial judge."42 At the trial, the only testimony was that of
the government, and the defendant did not take the stand. The trial judge
could reasonably believe the officers that there was consent. This case
does not treat at all the issues of the power of the court, over the objec-
tion of either party, to decide the disputed questions of fact and the
motion on affidavits alone, or of the right of the government to demand
to cross-examine the accused because he has submitted his affidavit.
And in In re Fried,4" "[n]o evidence was heard concerning the con-
fessions, as to which the district judge dismissed the petition on the
ground that the court lacked all power, before indictment, to suppress
the confessions, no matter how illegally obtained." 4 The real issue before
the appellate court, for which the affidavits provided only the factual
context, was the propriety of a motion to suppress use of evidence before
the grand jury. The court held that suppression could be proper and
reversed to have the trial court resolve the disputed facts and rule
accordingly.
Both Adelman and Fried indicate, that submission of affidavits by both
the accused and the government is a proper method by which to present
to the court the respective contentions concerning the facts of the case.
However, neither case would support a holding that the court might
dispose of the motion on the affidavits alone, over the objection of the
accused, unless the issue were one of law only. This seems to be the
position of Judge Tolin. Although he emphasizes the showing made in
the affidavits, he provides as a matter of course that the submission of
affidavits may be followed by oral testimony and cross-examination of
the afflants.45 This procedure of presentation of opposing factual conten-
tions by supporting affidavits is not entirely in accord with Judge Hal-
bert's outline. (See Judge Halbert's Rule 5.) However, it is not without
foundation in the Rules: Rule 47 permits the supporting affidavit, but
does not say whether this is discretionary with the court (Judge Halbert's
40 107 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939).
41 Id. at 499.
42 Ibid.
43 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).
44 Id. at 456.
45 United States v. Skeeters, 122 F.Supp. 52, 53, n.l. (S.D. Cal. C.D. 1954).
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position) or with the accused;4 6 and Rule 12(b) (4) allows resolution
of disputed issues of fact on affidavits or in any other manner the court
may direct, but does not say whether the court may do this over the
objection of the accused, to the deprivation of his -right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.47 Judge Tolin found himself confronted
with the unusual situation where the affidavits were very much in conflict;
yet, neither party wished to cross-examine the witnesses of the other.
Whatever rights existed in this regard were waived. The net result was
that Judge Tolin looked on the various affidavits as if the affiants had
testified directly on the witness stand, i.e., subject to little or no cross-
examination. The court in its discretion is able to judge the credibility
of the affiants from the written statements alone. In the Skeeters case,
Judge Tolin found the affidavit of the defendant the more credible and
consistent, and preferable to that of the officer who studiously avoided
issues dangerous to the position of the government. This was under-
scored by the fact that the officer was present in the court room at the
time of the hearing and could have been called if it were possible for him
to remove the doubts from his affidavit and negate the statements of
the defendant.
Since the burden of going forward with the evidence was on the de-
fendant, and since the government did not object to the introduction of
the defendant's affidavit, the defendant could agree to the use of the
government's affidavits as being substantially the testimony that could
have been elicited from the officers had they been called to the stand and
subjected to direct and cross-examination. The favorable and expeditious
result in Skeeters illustrates a weakness in Judge Halbert's outline, with
his stern treatment of the use of affidavits in support of the motion to
suppress. (See Judge Halbert's Rule 5 and Rule 6.)
In United States v. Cohen,48 the situation was similar to that in the
Skeeters case. Charged with interstate transmission of wagering informa-
tion, the defendant moved to suppress evidence "based upon the asser-
tion that evidence was seized by reason of a 'wire tap' and that there
was an illegal watch or cover placed on his mail."49 The defendant sup-
ported his motion with the affidavit of his attorney that questions asked
by the Internal Revenue Agents showed a knowledge of the contents of
the letters and of the telephone conversations, but he did not offer any
evidence. The government countered with' the affidavits of the United
States Attorney and of the Postmaster involved that, respectively, no
wire tap was used and only the outside wrappings of the mail was ob-
served.
46 Rule 47, supra note 16.
4 7 Rule 12(b) (4), supra note 16.
48 241 F.Supp. 269 (N.D. Cal. S.D. 1965).
49 Id. at 270.
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Upon the hearing of the motion it was argued by defendant's counsel
that oral testimony should be elicited in support of the motion. The
government contended that a prima facie case had not been made out
which would justify a purely exploratory procedure, and that the matter
should be disposed of on the record before the court.50
Chief Judge Harris agreed with the government. As in Skeeters, the motion
was decided on the affidavits alone, but here for a much different reason:
These conclusionary assertions [of the defendant] are patently insuffi-
cient to create an issue. In view of the categorical denial by the govern-
ment and the complete absence of any evidentiary material [referring
to defendant's affidavit, not oral testimony] to give support to the
defendant's charges, no issue has been presented which requires a
further hearing, or the taking of testimony for the determination of the
motion. [Citations.] [Emphasis supplied.]
The defendant has failed to support the motion by a prima facie
showing of alleged illegal conduct by the government and no issuable
fact has been raised. United States v. Warrington, D.C., 17 F.R.D. 25.51
As was true in Vomero and Skeeters, Chief Judge Harris would demand
that the affidavit in support of the motion state facts, which if proved are
sufficient to warrant granting the motion. (Compare Judge Halbert's
Rule 2.) If the accused fails this, he is not even entitled to a hearing on
the motion.52 Moreover, in Cohen, the uncontroverted affidavits of the
government established the legality of the agents' conduct.
III
Upon a consideration of the foregoing cases which deal with the problems
of a motion to suppress evidence and the use of supporting affidavits, it is
possible to suggest a suitable procedure.
An affidavit should not be considered competent evidence on which to
decide the motion unless the parties stipulate to the facts contained
therein. This is especially true with respect to the affidavits of the gov-
ernment, since the accused has the right under the Sixth Amendment to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. Thus, the court, over the objec-
tion of the accused, cannot compel the submission of affidavits and decide
the motion solely thereon. Nor should the affidavit of the accused be
considered a waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination, especially if the court should compel the submission of an
affidavit and then allow cross-examination on its contents.
Rather, the affidavit of the accused informs the court of the factual
contentions on which the accused bases his claim for relief. In this way,
the trial judge is apprised of the case prior to the hearing on the motion.
He is able to determine what factors in the proposed testimony are
50 Ibid.
51 Id. at 270-271.
52 The Supreme Court pointed out in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-342
(1939), that such preliminary showing is necessary to secure dispatch in criminal cases.
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essential to his decision and look for these factors as the circumstances
of the search and seizure are developed through the witnesses. Although
the court cannot compel the accused to submit an affidavit which will
expose him to cross-examination, the court can demand that the accused
make a prima facie showing through an affidavit before he is entitled to
a factual hearing at which he can present evidence.
The affidavit of the accused should operate as an offer to the govern-
ment to accept the account of the accused and permit the matter to be
argued as a question of law only. Just this one possibility, and the expedi-
tious result which will follow, should be sufficient to justify the suggested
use of affidavits in all cases.
If the ultimate burden will be on the government to justify the
search and seizure, the affidavit of the accused should be sufficient to
shift this burden of proof.53 The government would proceed with the
presentation of its case. If the government has submitted affidavits of its
witnesses, then the option will be with the accused whether to accept the
affidavits as evidence, i.e., as a stipulation of the facts, or to insist upon
his right under the Sixth Amendment to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.
Generally, the burden to go forward with the evidence, as well as the
ultimate burden of proof, will be on the accused; and in his affidavit in
support, he will make an apparent prima facie showing for relief.' If
the accused makes a prima facie showing, the option is with the govern-
ment whether to accept the affidavit as evidence or to insist upon the
accused proceeding with competent evidence, subject to cross-examina-
tion by the government. The usual procedure is for the accused to call
the arresting officers and anyone else who may have seen the alleged
illegal search and seizure to the witness stand and establish that their
testimony is essentially the same as the statement of facts in the affidavit.
53 It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the quantum of proof which either
the accused or the government must produce, once the burden of proof is fixed. Chin Kay v.
United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir.
1951); Woo LaI Chun v. United States, 274 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1960); Cervantes v. United
States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963).
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ; Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556
(D.C. Cir. 1955). Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1960). See Burke v.
United States, 328 F.2d 399 (Ist Cir. 1964); Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th
Cir. 1962); McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Roche, 36 F.R.D. 413 (D.Conn. 1965). United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1962) ; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). See United States v. Casanova,
213 F.Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Weinberg, 108 F.Supp 567, 569 (D.D.C.
1952). According to Judge Halbert, the moving party always has the initial burden to go
forward with the evidence. "There is respectable authority for the fact that officers are
presumed to do their duty." United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 29 (N.D. Cal. N.D.
1955).
54 The motion should be dismissed summarily if there is no prima facie showing for relief.
October 1966] COMMENTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
This would present a prima facie case. The accused may even take the
witness stand himself and be subjected to cross-examination by the gov-
ernment. 5 If the government offers no contrary evidence, the motion will
be granted.56 The same conclusion should follow if the accused makes a
prima facie showing by his affidavit alone, and the government neither
objects nor offers any evidence in opposition. By its silence, the govern-
ment in effect consents to an agreed statement of facts, the only issue
being one of law.
If the government meets the contentions of the accused's affidavit by
opposing affidavits, it is possible for the accused to agree to let the motion
be decided on the affidavits alone, if he believes that the statements of
the government's affiants are substantially what would be the result of
direct and cross-examination. 57 This would most probably occur in two
situations: first, where the affidavits of the accused and of the govern-
ment present substantially the same story, and the matter is resolved
actually as a question of law only; or second, where the affidavits are in
conflict, but the accused believes that his affidavit presents the more
credible and consistent version, and that the trial judge can determine
this from a reading of the documents alone.
These suggestions, it is submitted, should operate within Judge Hal-
bert's outline of procedure,5" but with a more liberal use of the affidavit
both in support of and in opposition to the motion to suppress. 9 In
55 It is arguable that the government could use the affidavit of the accused for impeach-
ment purposes. So also, the accused could use the affdavits of the government. However, this
point will be of little substance since the motion is decided by the trial judge alone. After
having read the affidavits, he is in a position to know when inconsistencies arise. If the
accused does waive his privilege against self-incrimination at the hearing on the motion, it is
of no effect on his right to invoke this privilege at the trial. See United States v. Miranti,
253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958).
56 Reversible error will not be avoided even if the government in its case-in-chief produces
testimony which conflicts with the prima facie showing. All disputed questions. of 1act must
be resolved in deciding the motion. Masiello v. United States, 304 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
But see, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), where the latter produced evidence
sufficient to justify denial of the motion to suppress was undisputed, and so did not constitute
prejudicial error.
57 See United States v. Skeeters, 122 F.Supp. 52 (S.D. Cal. C.D. 1954).
." United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 30 (N.D. Cal. N.D. 1955).
59 In this Rule 5, Judge Halbert states parenthetically: "An affidavit will always be per-
mitted when either party contends that the proceeding can be determined on a point of law
without an issue of fact being involved." United States v. Warrington, supra note 58. Query
whether or not this might be authority for submission of an affidavit of the accused in every
case. Few situations, if any, would prevent the accused from seeking government agreement
on the facts and submission on a question of law only. An affidavit is the proper vehicle for
this. Moreover, there is good authrity that, with consent of both parties, the matter can be
submitted on conflicting affidavits alone, contrary to Judge Halbert's holding that a dis-
puted issue of fact demands a hearing of oral testimony in all cases. And an affidavit of the
accused will certainly satisfy the requirement that he make a prima facie showing.
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general, this will lead to a more expeditious and efficient disposition of
the motion, without jeopardizing the rights of the accused or of the
government. Counsel for both are always free to object to the introduction
of the affidavit as evidence, if either feels proper disposition of the
motion demands a hearing of oral testimony.
Robert J. Gloistein
